The Role of the Corporate Attorney within the Takeover Context: Loyalties to Whom by Baer, Miriam
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
1996
The Role of the Corporate Attorney within the
Takeover Context: Loyalties to Whom
Miriam Baer
Brooklyn Law School, miriam.baer@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
21 Del. J. Corp. L. 943 (1996)
THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY
WITHIN THE TAKEOVER CONTEXT:
LOYALTIES TO WHOM?
BY MIRIAM P. HECHLER"
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the merger and acquisition context, the role of the corporate
attorney is both varied and significant In any one transaction, the
attorney may be asked to fulfill several functions.! Theoretically, the
attorney represents the corporation as an "entity."' The entity theory of
representation, however, is an unrealistic approach to corporate
representation in the takeover context because most takeovers involve
struggles for corporate control, and in the context of these struggles,
constituent interests are often adverse to one another? When conflicts
arise between corporate constituents, the attorney who seeks to represent
his "client" properly is left with little or no guidance from the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.4 Now that mergers and acquisitions have
regained prominence in the business world, corporate lawyers should take
the opportunity to formulate new Rules of Professional Conduct to
provide attorneys with better guidance and preserve the integrity of the
takeover process when constituent conflicts arise.
"Law clerk to The Honorable Jane R. Roth, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit; J.D., 1996, Harvard Law School; A.B., 1993, Princeton University. Any views
expressed hereby are solely those of the author.
'See discussion infra part II.
2MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmrBY EC 5-18 (1983); MODEL RuLEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.13 (1995); see discussion infra part IL
'The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized the potential conflict bstween
management and shareholders in takeover situations. In 1962, the court opined, "\We must bear
in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a threat
to corporate policy when a threat to control is involved. The directors arm of necessity
confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult." Bennettv. Propp,
187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962).
4See generally Symposium, The Role of Counsel in Corporate Acquisitions and
Takeovers: Conflicts and Complications, 39 HASTIGS LJ. 573 (1988). "The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct... fail to address the role of corporate and securities counseL" George
D. Reycraft, Conflicts of Interest and Effective Representation: The Dilemma of Corporate
Counsel, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 605,608 (1988) (explaining that in representing the corporation as
an entity, counsel struggles "with conflicting duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and zeal owed
to the various 'constituents' or interest groups [the board of directors, management, and
shareholders] that make up the organizational client").
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This article identifies several important roles lawyers fulfill in the
takeover context and then examines the ethical conflicts likely to arise
throughout the performance of those roles. The lawyer's presence in the
boardroom is no accident. Part II traces the Delaware courts' emphasis
on process in evaluating management's decisions to engage in or resist
various takeover transactions. Seminal cases, such as Smith v. Van
Gorkom5 and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,6 commonly cited
because they address issues of directorial fiduciary duty, also created and
enhanced the corporate attorney's role within the takeover context. Part
II further argues that an implicit assumption throughout these opinions is
that attorney participation enhances the integrity of the takeover process
and thereby protects shareholder welfare.
Part III discusses the lawyer's ethical obligations in fulfilling the
various roles defined in Part II. In particular, Part III explores the
question of what a lawyer should do when it appears that management's
interests are adverse to those of the shareholders. Before this question
can be answered, the corporate attorney must solve a more perplexing
riddle: Who is his client? The Model Code and Model Rules of
Professional Conduct each treat the corporation as an "entity."7 The
entity theory of representation is objectionable in times of competition for
corporate control because the identity of the corporate attorney's client
is unclear. Indeed, the "entity" may not even exist once the particular
transaction in question - a merger, acquisition, or leveraged buy-out -
is completed.
Part III also examines the Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC or Commission) view of corporate representation and attorney
obligation in the securities context. Voiced in the 1970s, the view
affected the version of the Model Rules provision pertaining to corporate
representation promulgated in 1983.8 Prior to the adoption of the Model
Rules, the SEC attempted to impose a more stringent obligation on
corporate attorneys to protect shareholders and the investor public from
opportunistic officers and directors. Therefore, Part III also examines
attorney responsibility for client misconduct under the SEC's disclosure
regulations. Although the SEC did not succeed in getting courts to
recognize an affirmative duty for lawyers to disclose client misconduct
5488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
6493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
'See discussion infra part HI.
'The ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Rules of Professional Conduct on
August 2, 1983. STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS xvii (1996).
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to shareholders, its view of attorney responsibility nevertheless affected
the corporate bar and is partly responsible for the current version of the
Model Rules that pertains to corporate representation. Part Ill concludes
that the Model Rules are more applicable to constituent conflict in the
securities context than they are in the takeover context.
Part IV attempts to alleviate the corporate attorney's current lack
of ethical guidance by suggesting several additions to the Model Rules.
The adoption of takeover defenses and the maintenance of auctions, areas
in which the corporate lawyer's loyalties are most likely to be tested, are
discussed. A brief review of the board members' duties in both situations
is followed by a discussion of the lawyers' corresponding obligations as
provided by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Whereas the
Delaware courts have set forth boundaries of proper director conduct, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct have failed to set forth boundaries
for proper attorney conduct. As a result, Part IV suggests two reforms
that attempt to provide the attorney better guidance in the takeover
context.
Finally, it should be noted that the current wave of takeover
activity has differed from the wave that dominated the 1980s, as many
transactions are now characterized as "friendly."9 Although it may make
defensive strategies less popular, the friendliness of the merger and
acquisition environment does not reduce the need for clarification of the
corporate attorney's professional responsibility. No matter how "friendly"
a merger or acquisition is characterized, constituent interests will still be
adverse. For example, in a so-called "friendly" environment, the current
officers of a target corporation might negotiate side payments (for
example, a particularly lucrative retirement package), in exchange for a
lower premium for the shareholders. This type of activity illustrates the
potentially adverse nature of shareholders' and management's interests,
regardless of whether the takeover is friendly or hostile. Thus, the
current takeover "wave," like the one that preceded it in the 1980s,
requires an examination of the conflicts of interest that the corporate
'See, e.g., Amy Stevens, Skadden Wins Contest for Bell Atlantic, But It Wasn't Easy,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1993, at B5 (reporting that friendlier deals of the current decade have
undermined Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom's dominance in takeover activity since
companies are less likely to turn to outside counsel for strategic assistance when takeover deals
are friendly). "If companies are going to bypass their usual outside lawyers and in-house
counsel for Skadden and its peers, there has to be a compelling reason." ld. See also Paul
Gibson, The Year of the Do-it-Yourself Megadeal, N.Y. TmIMs, Dec. 26, 1995, at A21
(discussing the rise in "do-it-yourself" deals, in which corporate managers structure megadeals
without the help of investment bankers).
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attorney confronts and the creation of rules or guidelines that allow the
attorney to resolve those conflicts fairly and efficiently.
II. THE LAWYER'S ROLE WITHIN THE TAKEOVER CONTEXT
The lawyer plays several roles within the takeover context. First,
he provides information to the directors which allows them to comply
with legal rules and obligations and to protect themselves from future
liability.'" Second, he serves a validation function in that his mere
presence in the boardroom when important decisions are made convinces
the courts that the directors' choices were well thought out and
informed." Third, the corporate attorney serves a strategic function in
advising the target or acquiror how to achieve its goals in preventing or
accomplishing a takeover.' 2 These roles exist as a result of the Delaware
judiciary's emphasis on process in reviewing actions taken in pursuit or
defense of corporate takeovers.
A. Compliance
Competitions for and changes in corporate control of publicly held
corporations include takeovers, acquisitions, mergers and leveraged buy-
outs. Each of these transactions threatens incumbent management with
"The role of providing advice "to keep management and the board out of trouble" has
been labeled a "traditional" role of the corporate lawyer. Ronald M. Loeb, Towards a More
Meaningfrul Role for the Corporate Lawyer in Corporate Governance, in ADVANCED
SEcuRrriEs LAW WORKSHOP 491, 493-94 (Harvey L. Pitt, chair, Practising Law Institute 1995).
"[W]hat the directors and officers typically want and what the lawyer gives is advice as to how
exposure to attacks by shareholders or other constituencies may be limited and what may be
done to limit directors' and officers' liability through indemnification and insurance." Id. at
494. Chief Justice Veasey has also written about the lawyer's role in insuring corporate
managers' compliance with Delaware's common law doctrines of fiduciary duty. E. Norman
Veasey, Duty of Loyalty: The Criticality of the Counselor's Role, 45 Bus. LAw. 2065, 2065
(1990) ("When lawyers are called upon to counsel boards of directors on their fiduciary duties,
the centerpiece of these counseling sessions is normally an analysis of the application of the
business judgment rule and the consequences of falling outside the rule.").
"See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In
examining the validity of a target's selective share repurchase, the Delaware Supreme Court
noted that Unocal's board of directors had been given "detailed presentation ... by legal
counsel regarding the board's obligations under both Delaware corporate law and the federal
securities laws." Id. at 950. See discussion infra part II.B.
'
2Martin Lipton is often credited with having created many of the defensive
mechanisms utilized by target management in resisting takeover attempts. See, e.g., Martin
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW, 101 (1979).
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loss of power, shareholders with loss of equity, or both. 3 Most types of
takeover activity entail a fundamental change in the make-up of the
corporation. Under Delaware corporation law, the officers of the
corporation run the day-to-day operations of the company, with the
oversight of the board of directors. 4 Together, officers and directors owe
a fiduciary duty of care and loyalty to the shareholders"5 who own the
corporation, elect the directors, and vote on extraordinary measures such
as mergers.1
6
Ordinarily, courts do not like to substitute their own judgment for
that of the corporation's management, which is presumed to have more
expertise and knowledge about what is best for the corporation than a
judge or shareholder. 7 The presumption that management's business
decisions are made with the best interests of the corporation in mind is
known as the "business judgment rule."'" Once the business judgment
rule is applied, "a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
board if the latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational business
purpose.
'
"
19
Despite its protective scope, the business judgment rule did not
shield directors from legal challenges to their decisions regarding
takeovers and acquisitions in the 1980s. Instead, the Delaware courts
spawned a number of opinions that ultimately held directors to a higher
standard of conduct than the mere "rational basis" test stated years ago in
"See generally R. FRAmriN BALoTn & JESSE A. FwmNEsTmN, THE DELAWARE LAW
OF COPORATnONS AND BusmNEsS ORGAeAzoNs § 6.51 (2d ed. 1990).
"4See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors .... ).
SSee, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179
(Del. 1986) (describing the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty as "the bedrock of our law
regarding corporate takeover issues").
I6DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (Supp. 1994) (providing in relevant part- he
[merger] agreement.. . shall be submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation
at an annual or special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement....").
"'Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (acknowledging "the managerial
prerogatives" of Delaware directors).
'
8Id. The business judgment rule is a presumption "that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Id.
"'Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971)). When the director's self-interest is present, the courts apply the more rigorous
"entire fairness" test outlined in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710-11 (Del. 1983).
Unlike the business judgment rule, the entire fairness test addresses the substantive merits of
the transaction and places on directors the burden of establishing that the transaction is the
result of both a fair price and fair dealing. I. at 710.
1996]
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Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien.2 ° The watershed case that forced directors
to examine the full meaning of the fiduciary duty of care was Smith v.
Van Gorkom.2"
In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held the directors of
the Trans Union corporation personally liable to its shareholders for
failing to properly value the company prior to selling it to the Pritzker
family, despite the premium Pritzker paid above the stock price.22 Van
Gorkom, the CEO of Trans Union, was a lawyer and certified public
accountant and was nearing mandatory retirement age.23  On
September 13, 1980, Van Gorkom met with Jay Pritzker to propose a sale
of the company at $55 per share.24 At this point, with the exception of
the company's controller, Van Gorkom had consulted no investment
bankers, lawyers or directors.' Five days later, on September 18,
Pritzker and Van Gorkom met again and Pritzker agreed to the $55 per
share price and set a price at which Trans Union would issue Pritzker
treasury stock - the so-called "lock up" agreement - that would be
exercised in the event another buyer subsequently offered a higher price
for Trans Union.26
It is apparent that both Pritzker and Van Gorkom regarded their
lawyers purely as drafting agents.27 At the September 18 meeting,
"Pritzker instructed his attorney, a merger and acquisition specialist, to
begin drafting merger documents. 2  Later in its opinion, the court notes,
"Pritzker's lawyer was then instructed to draft the merger documents, to
be reviewed by Van Gorkom's lawyer, 'sometimes with discussion and
sometimes not, in the haste to get it finished."'29 Pritzker gave Van
20280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
21488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
DId. at 893.
"Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865-66. According to the opinion, Van Gorkom was
something of a takeover "specialist":
He had participated in many acquisitions as a manager and director of Trans
Union and as a director of other companies. He was familiar with acquisition
procedures, valuation methods, and negotiations; and he privately considered
the pros and cons of whether Trans Union should seek a privately or publicly-
held purchaser.
Id. at 866.
241d.
Sd. In fact, Van Gorkom told the controller that he wanted no one on his staff to
know about the leveraged buyout he planned to propose to Pritzker. Id.
26 d. at 867.
"See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867.
281d.
291d.
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Gorkom only three days to answer his offer? One day later, after Van
Gorkom had put together this tentative deal, he retained an outside
attorney "to advise Trans Union on the legal aspects of the merger."'
The court noted that Van Gorkom consulted neither William Browder, a
former head of the legal department and then current Trans Union
Director, nor William Moore, the present head of Trans Union's legal
department.3 2
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom
substantially transformed the corporate attorney's role within the takeover
process. The Supreme Court's opinion focused on the process employed
in takeover transactions as opposed to the substantive value of managerial
decisions.3 "[T]hat [the court's] test for negligence focuses almost
exclusively on the board's process, rather than the substance of its
decision, is now well settled."34 Chancellor Allen later affirmed this
reading of Van Gorkom in AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton &
Co.35 There, the chancellor stated that courts ordinarily would decline to
review the merits of a corporate transaction, "once it is shown that the
decision to accomplish the transaction was made by directors with no
financial interest in the transaction adverse to the corporation and that in
reaching the decision the director followed an appropriately deliberative
process."3
Van Gorkom's emphasis on process enlarged the corporate
attorney's presence in the boardroom in two ways. First, directors and
officers needed corporate attorneys to explain the Van Gorkom decision
itself and its interpretation of "due care."37 More important, attorneys
3"Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867. Ironically, the legal advice the outside counselor
provided to Trans Union's directors was to tell them that they might be sued if they declined
Pritzker's offer. L at 868.
3'1d at 867. The court further noted that with the exception of Trans Union's
controller and chief operating officer, no one was informed of the purpose of a special meeting
of the Trans Union Board. Id
3"See id at 872-73 (stripping directors who have made "unadvised" or ill-informed
judgments of business judgment rule protection).
3'T. Richard Giovanelli, Note, Revisiting Revlon: The Rumors of its Demise Have
Been Greatly Exaggerated, 37 WN. & MARY L. REv. 1513, 1526 (1996) (citation omitted).
3'519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
3Id. at 111.
3"Chief Justice Veasey observes, "Since the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in
Smith v. Van Gorkom, practitioners have counseled directors extensively on the due care
component of the directorial decisionmaking process, and that component is reasonably well
understood." Veasey, supra note 10, at 2065.
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could provide valuable counsel to corporate directors and officers in the
construction and maintenance of an acceptable takeover process."s
In this manner, the corporate attorney acquired the role of ensuring
management's compliance with Delaware's common law doctrines of
fiduciary duty. Lawyers would counsel corporate managers as to how to
complete mergers and acquisitions without meeting the same results as
the ill-fated Trans Union transaction. In doing so, the attorney
presumably would contribute value to an "appropriately deliberative
process,"39 in which directors and officers would be adequately
"informed. "40 These informed directors and officers, in turn, would carry
out the best interests of the corporation's shareholders. Attorney
participation in takeover transactions thus became a method which would
guarantee the integrity of takeover process.
B. Validation
If the Van Gorkom decision placed the lawyer in the boardroom
prior to and during takeover negotiations, then later decisions ensured that
he could stay there. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the
Delaware Supreme Court added an enhanced scrutiny test to the business
judgment rule for evaluating the propriety of defensive conduct of
incumbent board members in response to takeover bids.4 ' First, board
members had to identify some threat to shareholder welfare justifying
their defensive reaction.42 Second, their response had to be proportional
"Barbara Gustafson has written:
[A]fter opinions like Trans Union, corporate directors are understandably
apprehensive about relying on their own knowledge and expertise to guide
them in their decision-making processes. Under these circumstances, lawyers
become indispensable in leading the target directors through the detailed
procedural requirements that the Delaware courts use in analyzing informed
business judgment in both merger and tender offer situations.
Barbara J. Gustafson, Note, The Lawyer as Impresario: Form vs. Substance in the Target's
Boardroom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 790 (1988). -
"9AC Acquisition, 519 A.2d at 111.
"'Giovanelli, supra note 34, at 1526.
"'Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. "Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders,
there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred." Id. In Unitrin Inc. v. American
Gen. Corp., 657 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995), the Delaware Supreme Court declared: "The
common law pronouncement in Unocal of enhanced judicial scrutiny, as a threshold or
condition precedent to an application of the traditional business judgment rule, is now well
known."42Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Due to the inherent conflict of interest confronted by
[Vol. 21
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to the threat they were seeking to avert: "If a defensive measure is to
come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed."
43
Prior to Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court had held that the
business judgment rule applied to takeovers." Nevertheless, citing the
"omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests," the Unocal court crafted an enhanced scrutiny test for
evaluating a target corporation's defensive tactics.45 Despite the adoption
of this stricter test, the court nevertheless affirmed the defense tactic of
the Unocal Board, an exclusive share repurchase, in fending off a hostile
takeover bid by T. Boone Pickens.46 Some commentators have suggested
that the court's holding was in part tied to its dislike of T. Boone
Pickens.47 Another explanation for the decision in Unocal is the extent
of attorney participation in helping the directors arrive at their decision
to offer a share repurchase to shareholders.4" The day Mesa made a two-
tiered tender offer for Unocal's stock, Unocal's Board met for 9 1/2
hours, in which "detailed presentations were made by legal counsel
regarding the board's obligations under both Delaware corporate law and
the federal securities laws."49 Thus, the presence of counsel in Unocal's
boardroom provided a strong indication that the board's decision was
reasonable and in the best interests of shareholders."
directors in takeover transactions, the court declared, "[D]irectors must show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed
because of another person's stock ownership." Id
431d, The directors would have to analyze the "nature of the takeover bid and its effect
on the corporate enterprise" giving consideration to the adequacy of the price offered, "the
nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality," and other concerns. Ild
"Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984).
"Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
"Ia at 959. "IThe threat was posed by a corporate raider with a national reputation
as a 'greenmailer."' l at 956.47Bonnie G. Camden, Note, The Reasonableness of Defensive Takeover Maneuvers
When the Corporate Raider is Mr. T. Boone Pickens: Ivanhoe Partners v. Nemont Mining
Corp., 57 U. CitN. L. REV. 739,759-60 (1988) (arguing that the presence of T. Boone Pickens
made target's actions in the Newmont Mining case appear more reasonable due to the court's
dislike of Pickens).
"See Gustafson, supra note 38, at 781-84. The author argues that Delawae courts
have adopted an approach for evaluating director conduct in takeover situations that considers
the aid given to management by outside legal counsel in examining all of the relevant factors
of the takeover bid. See also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (discussing the relevant factors).
49Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950. In conjunction with financial presentations made by
Unocal's investment bankers, the attorney involvement led the court of chancery to conclude
in part that the "directors' decision [to oppose the Mesa tender offer] was made in the good
faith belief that the Mesa tender offer is inadequate." Id at 958.
'Under the enhanced scrutiny test announced in Unocal,
1996]
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Unocal thus confirmed the corporate attorney's validation function
within the takeover context. By having attorneys present at the crucial
meetings, directors could prove to courts that they intended to protect
shareholders from unfair bids to entrench themselves in office.
C. Strategy
The Unocal decision not only affirmed the attorney's validation
function within the takeover process, but also rewarded strategic
innovation in defending against takeovers when it upheld Unocal's
exclusive share repurchase."' Although no explicit authority existed in
Delaware corporation law for the type of defense tactic utilized by
Unocal, the court nevertheless held: "[O]ur corporate law is not static.
It must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of,
evolving concepts and needs. Merely because the General Corporation
Law is silent as to a specific matter does not mean that it is prohibited.""
By sanctioning the growth of new defensive tactics to fend off takeover
bids, the court confirmed another role lawyers had begun to fulfill in the
takeover context: that of "strategist," aiding directors and officers to
defend the company from profit-seeking raiders.
The corporate attorney's contribution to the creation of defensive
tactics is illustrated in Moran v. Household International, Inc.s3  In
Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the propriety of an
adoption of a flip-in/flip-over poison pill prior to any takeover bid or
announcement of a tender offer by a potential raider. 4 After holding that
the directors possessed authority to adopt the poison pill, the court then
discussed the propriety of the directors' conduct under Unocal and Van
[t]he directors satisfy their threshold burden of showing a threat to corporate
policy and effectiveness ... by showing good faith and a reasonable
investigation, a burden which may be satisfied by demonstrating that the
decision was made by disinterested and independent directors acting upon
advice of counsel and other experts.
Veasey, supra note 10, at 2080.
"Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. The court found that what it deemed the "selective
exchange offer" was reasonably related to the threat posed to the corporation. Id.
"Id. at 957. The court took particular note of the modem "two-tier 'front-end' loaded
offers with their coercive effects" upon target corporations. Id.
"500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
"See id. The "flip-in" aspect of the poison pill allowed shareholders to exercise the
Right to buy 1/100 of preferred stock for $100. Id. at 1349. If the Rights were not exercised
and a takeover took place, the "flip-over" portion of the pill allowed shareholders to exercise
their Rights to buy $200 of the common stock of the tender offeror for $100. Id.
[Vol. 21
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Gorkom.5 In upholding the directors' actions, the court noted with
approval the participation of the Wachtell, Lipton law firm in the
decision-making process leading to the adoption of the poison pill, stating
that
The Directors were given beforehand a notebook which
included a three-page summary of the Plan along with
articles on the current takeover environment. The extended
discussion between the Board and representatives of
Wachtell, Lipton and Goldman, Sachs before approval of the
Plan reflected a full and candid evaluation of the Plan.!6
Moran, like Unocal, confirmed that corporate attorneys legitimately
functioned as strategists within the takeover process. Implicit in the
Moran decision was the assumption that legal strategists provided value
to the entire corporate entity, as opposed to the directors and officers who
controlled it.
D. Conclusion
The decisions of the Delaware judiciary expanded the corporate
attorney's role within the takeover context. In order to protect their
decisions, directors would have to show that they had participated in an
"appropriately deliberative" process prior to making crucial takeover
decisions. Corporate attorneys not only helped craft evaluative
procedures that passed judicial muster, but they also assisted anxious
directors of target corporations in preparing defenses against hostile
takeovers. It is evident from a comparison of the Delaware judiciary's
opinions in Van Gorkom, Unocal, and Moran, that the Delaware Supreme
Court believed that lawyers would enhance the substantive value of their
client's decisions by helping them negotiate the particulars of the
takeover process. This process, in turn, would provide shareholders
greater protection from overreaching officers and directors.
III. THE ATrORNEY'S OBLIGATIONS IN THE TAKEOVER CONTEXT:
To WHOM DOES COUNSEL OWE HIs LOYALTY?
The preceding section examined the roles corporate attorneys play
within the takeover process and argued that these roles were created and
551d at 1355-57.
m Ia at 1356.
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maintained by the Delaware Supreme Court's takeover jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, whatever value attorneys might provide their clients in
takeover situations is undermined by ambiguous rules of professional
responsibility governing corporate attorneys.
A. Who is the Client?
As one practitioner observes, "The corporate lawyer who resorts to
[the Model Rules] for assistance usually finds nothing more than silence
or vague generalities that are of little help in solving practical, immediate
concerns."57  This is especially true in the context of takeover
transactions. 8
According to the traditional understanding of professional
responsibility, "The lawyer's professional responsibility obligations arise
from the fundamental fiduciary duty that a lawyer owes to his client." 9
The primary source of confusion for the corporate attorney in the
takeover context is the fact that the identity of his "client" is unclear.6"
Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, "A lawyer
employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer,
17Frederick W. Kanner, Overview of Professional Responsibility Issues for the
Corporate Lawyer, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 211, 221 (Robert
J. Jossen, chair, Practicing Law Institute 1988). See also ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS
IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 285-87 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing ambiguities in the Model
Code and Model Rules).
SSeveral commentators have set forth proposals formore context-specific ethical rules.
See, e.g., Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the
Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 149, 149 (1993) (arguing that the current rules
"do not provide enough fact-specific provisions that apply directly to many of the various legal
specialties"); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REV. 468, 516
(1990) (stating that "legal ethics must develop a set of 'middle-level principles' that both isolate
and respond to relevant differences in social and institutional context"); Bryan J. Pcchersky,
Note, Representing General Partnerships and Close Corporations: A Situational Analysis of
Professional Responsibility, 73 TEX. L. REV. 919, 925 (1995) (arguing that "situational
analysis" should guide ethical rules regarding representation of partnerships and closely held
corporations).
"Kanner, supra note 57, at 215. Kanner further indicates that the lawyer's fiduciary
duty to his client
encompasses obligations of (i) confidentiality, which fosters the candor
necessary for successfil representation, (ii) loyalty, which ensures that the
client's interests will not be compromised by any desire on the part of the
lawyer to serve two masters and (iii) care, which requires the competence
necessary to protect adequately the client's interests.
Id.
°Reycraft, supra note 4, at 609.
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employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity."6'
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were adopted in 1983
to supersede the Model Code, similarly refer to the corporation as an
entity; "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents."'
Constituents, in turn, are defined to include "officers, directors,
employees and shareholders."
63
As of 1996, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
adopted, in some form, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct." Like
the Model Code, the Model Rules treat the corporation as a juridical
entity, separate from its constituents. 6' Not only has this theory of
representation been criticized in several contexts other than takeovers,"
it was also proven to be a particularly inappropriate guide for an attorney
who represents a corporation which may not even exist after the
consummation of a particular transaction.67
61MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1983). EC 5-18 further
states, "In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his professional
judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires of any person or organization." See
also Reycraft, supra note 4, at 608 (further explaining the issues of conflicting duties of loyalty
and confidentiality)
"MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoN=UC Rule 1.13(a) (1995).
"Id cmt 2.
6
'GILLEP.s & SIMON, supra note 6, at xvii.
"See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
'See generally Bruce A. Mann & Marcus D. Wilkinson, The Role of Counsel in
Venture Capital Transactions ifDisputesArise, 46 BUS. LAW. 759 (1991) (discussing corporate
representation of venture capital firms); Michelle D. Monse, Ethical Issues In Representing
Thrifts, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1992) (arguing that the banking institution lawyer also is unsure
of his client's identity and is therefore subject to malpractice suits from federal receivership
agencies such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
Because of the legal fiction that a corporation is a juridical person separate
from any of its constituent parts, the lawyer, it is said, represents that artificial
being alone. Yet artificial beings require actual beings to speak and act for
them. Ordinarily the interests of the constituents and the entity coincide...
[b]ut many instances arise in which the entity's interests are difficult to
ascertain, or those interests conflict with constituents' interests or with public
policy. At that point, it becomes vital, yet markedly more difficult, for the
lawyer to answer the central question "who is the client?"
Monse, supra, at 5.
'Ralph Jonas, Who is the Client?: The Corporate LaFer's Dilemma, 39 HASTINGs
LJ. 617, 618 (1988).
[W]hen [a lawyer's] client disappears by operation of law, such as a merger
in which the client is not the survivor, the lawyer presides over his client's
voluntary destruction. Is it functional to argue that the lawyer's absolute
allegiance to his corporate client, to the exclusion of that corporation's
shareholders, permits the attorney to preside over his client's death?
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Model Rule 1.13(b) provides the lawyer with some basic guidance
as to how to handle officer action that he perceives to be "a violation of
a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result
in substantial injury to the organization."68 The attorney's course of
action may include, but is not limited to:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be
sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the
organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the
organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of
the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in
behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law. 9
According to the Comment accompanying Rule 1.13, when officers and
directors make decisions for the corporation, those decisions "ordinarily
must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is
doubtful."7  Only if the attorney "knows" that the officer's intended
action is a "violation of law" or, more important in the takeover context,
a "violation of a legal obligation to the organization," can the corporate
attorney take steps to correct potentially harmful action or inaction by the
corporation's officers.7 '
Once the attorney has ascertained a potential violation, his reaction
under the Model Rules is guided by the severity of the officer's
conduct.72 For example, a mere infraction might merit no more than the
attorney's request that the officer reconsider his decision.73 A more
serious matter might require the lawyer to have the issue considered by
a "higher authority within the organization."'74 Finally, in extreme
Id. at 618.
68MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995).
691d. Section (c) provides for resignation by the corporate attorney under certain
circumstances. Section (d) states that a lawyer should explain the "identity of the client" when
the organization's interests are adverse to "those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
dealing." Section (e) provides for simultaneous representation of the organization and one of
its constituents provided the organization renders its consent. Id.
1Id. cmt. 3.
'See id.
72See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995).
73See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)(1) (1995).
741d. Rule 1.13(b)(3).
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circumstances, the attorney may appeal directly to the board of
directors.75 If the board then insists upon following a course of action
"that is clearly a violation of lmv and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization," the lawyer may then resign.76 Under this
framework, withdrawal is always a last resort.7
On one hand, the Model Rules might be lauded as providing the
attorney the requisite flexibility to decide upon the best course of action
for his client according to the particular circumstances concerning the
officer's conduct.78 Nevertheless, there are several flaws within the
Model Rules' framework of ethical representation of corporate clients
when those clients are considering takeovers, mergers, or acquisitions.
First, because the organization may not exist subsequent to the corporate
transaction, it is difficult to ascertain what behavior would "result in
substantial injury to the organization."" Although an unfair leveraged
buy-out might result in substantial injury to shareholder interests, it might
have no effect on the corporation as an entity; to the contrary, the terms
of the buy-out might generate great gains for the now-privately owned
corporation.8"
Second, most types of officer and director misconduct cited in
cases such as Van Gorkom involve violations offiduciary duty as opposed
to violations of laws or regulations.8 Although Rule 1.13(b) refers to the
officer's "legal obligation to the organization," the concept of fiduciary
7See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmL 4 (1995) ("In an
extreme case, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to refer the matter to the
organization's highest authority. Ordinarily, that is the board of directors or similar governing
body.'). It has been noted that "[t]he professional rules place the onus of determining vwhether
to go over the heads of the corporation's authorized representatives directly on the attorney.
This is quite properly a recognition that ultimately it is the practitioner who must decide
whether his conduct and advice are legitimate." James P. Hemmer, Resignation of Corporate
Counsel: Fulfillment or Abdication of Duty, 39 HAsTI GS LU. 641, 655-56 (1988) (citations
omitted).
76MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(c) (1995) (emphasis added).
Rule 1.13(c) is restrictive, because lawyers will rarely ever be able to perceive a "clear"
violation of law, particularly where fiduciary duties are concerned. Hemmer, supra note 75,
at 658. Moreover, the rule merely permits the lawyer to resign, it does not compel him to.
a
77MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1995). For more on
withdrawal and its function as a disclosure device, see Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of
Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and
Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REv. 455, 471-84 (1984).
7MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1995).
"'MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995).
'Hemmer, supra note 75, at 655.
"See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
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duty is not even mentioned in the Rule's commentary, which, in
conjunction with the resignation clause in 1.13(c), focuses exclusively on
violations of law. 2 Similarly, Rule 1.2(d), which proscribes an attorney's
participation in the perpetration of fraud, says nothing about the lawyer's
contribution to a person's violation of fiduciary duty.83 Moreover, Model
Rule 1.6 imposes on the attorney a strict duty of confidentiality, allowing
him to disclose his client's confidences only if necessary to prevent a
criminal act likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm. 4 Thus, an attorney apparently cannot reveal the board's violations
of fiduciary duty to shareholders. Taken as a whole, Rules 1.2, 1.6, and
1.13 create an ethical vacuum that all but swallows managerial violations
of fiduciary duty. The ABA not only recognizes this vacuum, but
implicitly supports it in ABA Opinion 94-380 by indicating that an
attorney representing a fiduciary owes a duty of responsibility to his
client only, and not to the fiduciary's intended beneficiary. 5
82Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995) with
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(c) & cmt. 5 (1995).
"'See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1995) (indicating that "[a]
lawyer shall not... assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent
.... "); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(c) (1995) (allowing counsel to
resign when the board insists upon engaging in conduct that is a violation of law).
"4See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995):
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except...
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
As written, Rule 1.6 prohibits corporate attorneys from disclosing client confidences
to regulatory agencies, even when those clients intend to break particular regulations or laws.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995). It is unclear if Rule 1.6
applies to disclosures to shareholders, because the owners of the corporation arguably may be
considered the "client" for purposes of confidentiality. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1995).
"ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 94-380]. The opinion states in relevant part:
A lawyer who represents the fiduciary in a trust or estate matter is subject to
the same limitations imposed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as
are all other lawyers. The fact that the fiduciary has obligations to the
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A third problem with Rule 1.13 is that its resignation option may
be difficult to invoke when managers fail to uphold fiduciary duties to
shareholders in the takeover context. Because Rule 1.13(c) speaks only
of clear violations of law "likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization," the attorney may not be able to resign.8"
Rule 1.16(b), the general withdrawal provision, also allows
voluntary resignation when a client persists in a course of action
involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is
criminal or fraudulent" or other "good cause for withdrawal exasts."'
The attorney cannot take advantage of the provision for voluntary
withdrawal of Rule 1.16, however, unless "withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the
client."8" Because timing is often of the essence in the takeover context,
it is difficult to conceive of any withdrawal that would not create a
material adverse effect for the client.
Finally, Rule 1.13 appears to restrict attorneys from disclosing
fiduciary violations to shareholders,89 arguably the constituency most
deserving of protection in takeover situations. The Rule stresses that the
beneficiaries of the trust or estate does not in itself either expand or limit the
lawyer's obligations to the fiduciary client under the Model Rules, nor impose
on the lawyer obligations toward the beneficiaries that the lawyer would not
have toward other third parties. Specifically, the lawyer's obligation to
preserve the client's confidences under Rule 1.6 is not altered by the
circumstance that the client is a fiduciary.
Id, See also Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary's Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary
Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 889, 892 (criticizing the ABA's opinion). Tuttle
criticizes the ABA Opinion for failing to take account of the special nature of fiduciary
representation. Id He indicates that "ABA 94-380 ignores the peculiar nature of th6
fiduciary's role and relationship with the beneficiaries, and risks incoherence in its attempt to
force fiduciary representation into the basic model of the attorney-client relationship." Id. It
is important to note that the corporate attorney is not bound by this Formal Opinion because
he represents the corporation as an entity, not the corporation's managers (who owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its shareholders). See ABA Formal Op. 94-380, supra.
'6MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.13(c) (1995) (emphasis added).
This rule in practice "will seldom permit counsel to resign." Hemmer, supra note 75, at 658.
The author indicates that, in practice, violations of law involving issues of business judgment
are not clear. Id
7MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.16(b)(l), (6) (1995). Rule
1.16(a), which mandates withdrawal in limited circumstances, is generally inapplicable to
problems encountered in the takeover context unless the attorney firmly believes that his
"representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law." Id
Rule 1.16(a)(1). It is doubtful that the violations of fiduciary duty discussed throughout this
article would qualify under this provision of the Model Rules.
"MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.16(b) (1995).
"See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995).
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attorney should move cautiously "in the best interest of the organization,"
minimize any "disruption," and reduce the risk of revealing information
to "persons outside the organization."" The text does not clarify whether
shareholders are considered persons "outside the organization. "91 The
Rule goes on to say, however, that the attorney may reveal misconduct
to "the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization."92 As
shareholders lack the authority to act on behalf of the corporation, 93 this
language would appear to preclude disclosure to shareholders. 94 Thus,
under the current framework, "the strongest action a lawyer may take is
to resign, but resignation must be triggered by harm to the corporation,
not to third parties."9'  The Rule fails to state with clarity whether
shareholders are to be considered the attorney's "client" or mere third
parties.
Close examination of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
raises many issues about proper attorney conduct in the takeover context,
but provides little guidance on these issues.96 It is clear that if the
corporation's management intends to engage in illegal conduct, the
attorney may appeal to the board, and if that fails, the attorney may
resign from his position.97 However, if the board of directors wishes to
engage in action that violates its fiduciary duties to shareholders, the
attorney is at a loss to determine a proper course of action.98 Rule
1.13(b) allows him to appeal to the board, but Rule 1.13(c) seemingly
does not give him enough latitude to resign, and Rule 1.6 may keep him
from revealing the intended harm to shareholders.99 In short, the lawyer's
"See id. An earlier draft of the Rule permitted the attorney to disclose client
confidences to persons outside the organization ifthe board refused to alter its action to comply
with the law. See Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the
Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, I GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 298-99 (1987);
Tuttle, supra note 85, at 924-25.
9'See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 & cmts. (1995).
9MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)(3) (1995).
9See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991).
94See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995). Commentators
have identified "'the highest authority' as including only those who are legally competent to
act on the corporation's behalf - i.e., not shareholders." Tuttle, supra note 85, at 924-25 &
n.190. But see Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who is the
Client?, 62 FORDHAML. REV. 1319,1338 (1994) (assuming attorneys may disclose confidences
to shareholders without breaking the Rules of Professional Conduct if such disclosure is in the
best interest of the corporation and is reasonably necessary).
95Hemmer, supra note 75, at 658 n.67.
96See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1995).
971d.
"See id.
9See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.13(b), (c) & 1.6
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hands are tied when he knows that the corporation's board plans a course
of action that violates the duties of loyalty and care owed to its
shareholders.
B. The SEC's View of Attorney Responsibility
As discussed above, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct treat
the corporation as an entity, attempting to guide the corporate attorney
with a flexible course of action based on the severity of the officer's
suspected misconduct. This next section examines the subject of officer
misconduct in the securities context and argues that the Model Rules'
emphasis on disclosure was the result of the corporate bar's reaction to
the SEC's attempts to enforce strict standards of attorney conduct in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.' The Rule therefore fails to address
structural issues that plague the takeover context.'
Throughout the last three decades, the SEC has moved back and
forth in its view of corporate attorney responsibility where securities are
involved. 1°2 In the late 1970s, the SEC adopted an aggressive view of
attorney responsibility where disclosure requirements were concerned.0 3
In 1978, the Commission set forth its view in SEC v. National Student
Marketing"° that corporate attorneys harbored a direct obligation to
(1995) (addressing confidentiality of information).
"'For a more in-depth discussion of the securities lawyers' obligations under the SEC
rules and regulations, see Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liabilityfor Client Fraud, 1991 COLMRI.
Bus. L. REv. 1. See also Ann Maxey, Competing Duties? Securities Layers'Liability After
Central Bank, 64 FORDHh L. REv. 2185 (1996).
"'Obviously, overlap exists between the "takeover" and "securities" contexts. A merger
or acquisition might involve both violations of fiduciary duty and violations of the securities
laws. The ethical dilemmas with which this article is concerned involve the attorney's
perception of management's violations of common law doctrines of fiduciary duty, not
violations of written securities laws or regulations. Thus, the term "securities context" refers
to instances in which the attorney is aware of an officer's or director's violation of a particular
law or regulation. 'Takeover context," on the other hand, indicates those instances in which
the attorney perceives conduct throughout the takeover process that suggests the officer's or
director's failure to uphold fiduciary duties of care or loyalty to the corporation and its
shareholders.
"'Simon M. Lome & W. Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against Laiyers
Before the SEC, 50 Bus. LAW. 1293 (1995). "The proper forum for SEC actions against
lawyers has been a subject of considerable controversy for the past twenty-five years, as has
the standard governing the decision whether to institute such actions, as well as the standards
which should determine how those actions, once instituted, are decided." Id at 1294.
"'ORoberta S. Karmel, Reining the Bar By Naming Laiyers as 'Causes," N.Y. L.,
Apr. 18, 1996, at 3, 35.
°457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
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shareholders to protect them from overreaching directors and officers." 5
The SEC filed a complaint for injunctive relief under the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act" 6 against White & Case and
Lord, Bissell & Brook for their failure to speak out at a merger closing
even though they knew that the proxy materials given to shareholders
prior to the closing were materially defective. 7 The SEC asserted in its
complaint that the two firms were guilty of aiding and abetting a
violation of securities laws and regulations by failing to uphold their duty
to disclose their clients' actions to either the SEC or to the investor
public.' The SEC argued that if recalcitrant board members were
unwilling to follow disclosure regulations, then their attorneys should
disclose the defects in the materials to either the Commission or the
shareholders. '09
Although the district court found that Lord, Bissell & Brook and
its attorneys". had aided and abetted a securities fraud by participating
in the merger closing, it did not adopt the SEC's expansive view of
10 The court indicated:
The Commission's allegations of aiding and abetting by the defendants,...
seem to fall into four basic categories: (1) the failure of the attorney
defendants to take any action to interfere in the consummation of the merger;
(2) the issuance by the attorneys of an opinion with respect to the merger; (3)
the attorneys' subsequent failure to withdraw that opinion and inform the
Interstate shareholders or the SEC of the inaccuracy of the nine-month
financials; and (4) the issuance by the attorneys and Brown of an opinion and
letter, respectively, concerning the validity of the stock sales under Rule 133.
Id. at 712 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The first and third categories of the SEC
complaint implied that corporate attorneys harbored whistle-blowing obligations under the
securities laws. Id.
'06Id. at 686.
'
071d at 699-700.
'"National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 699-701.
"'OId at 701. The Supreme Court recently called into question the Commission's
ability to bring actions under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
when it decided Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). In Central
Bank, the Court held that private parties could not bring "aiding and abetting" causes of action
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id. at 1446. 'That decision swept away thirty years of federal
common law by limiting the reach of private remedies against lawyers and others who provide
services in connection with the offering of securities." Maxey, supra note 100, at 2187. The
Central Bank decision also created doubt about the Commission's ability to bring similar types
of actions under § 16(b) against attorneys and others accused of aiding or abetting securities
violations. Congress, however, explicitly authorized the Commission to bring such actions in
1995, when it enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
67. See generally Maxey, supra note 100, at 1287-89.
"'White & Case had settled its part of the case by this time. Kanner, supra note 57,
at 258.
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attorney obligation."' Instead, the district court adopted a middle ground
between complete passivity and whistle blowing."' The court was,
however, highly critical of the attorneys for taking no steps to delay the
closing of the merger: "the attorneys' responsibilities to their corporate
client required them to take steps to ensure that the information would be
disclosed to the shareholders.""' The court concluded, "[A]t the very
least, [the lawyers] were required to speak out at the closing concerning
the obvious materiality of the information and the concomitant
requirement that the merger not be closed until the adjustments were
disclosed and approval of the merger was again obtained from the...
shareholders.""1 4 Merely providing advice to the client was not enough;
henceforth, attorneys would be expected to take some steps to prevent
fiaud or lack of disclosure prior to a closing.1
Despite the SEC's prodding, the district court would not go so far
as to hold that the attorneys harbored a whistle-blowing obligation after
the merger had taken place." 6 Rejecting the SEC's expansive view of
attorney obligation, the district court denied the injunction on the grounds
that the attorneys could not be involved in a continuing violation of
securities law after the merger had already taken place."7
In addition to its power to bring cases against attorneys in Article
III courts, the SEC also asserted administrative power to sanction and
disqualify attorneys from practicing before it under Rule 2(e) of the
SEC's Rules of Practice, which provides:
"'National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 712. The court indicated that it
"concur[red] with regard to the attorneys' failure to interfere with the closing, but must
conclude that the remaining actions or inaction alleged to constitute aiding and abetting did not
substantially facilitate either the merger or the stock sales." Id.
"'21d at 712-14.
"'Id. at 713.
"
4Id
"'As for the SEC's suggestion that the attorneys had a responsibility to "undo" the
merger, the district court responded, 'The SEC's contention with regard to counsel's alleged
acquiescence in the merger transaction raises significant questions concerningthe responsibility
of counsel." National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 714.
"
61d at 714-15.
'"National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 714-17. The court indicated that
[e]ven if the attorneys' fiduciary responsibilities to the ... shareholders
continued beyond the merger, the breach of such a duty %vould not have the
requisite relationship to a securities transaction, since the merger had already
been completed. It is equally obvious that such subsequent action or inaction
by the attorneys could not substantially assist the merger.
d. at 714-15.
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(e) Suspension and disbarment. (1)... The Commission
may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently,
the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way
to any person who is found by the Commission... (ii) [t]o
be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in
unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) [t]o have
willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the
violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or
the rules and regulations thereunder." 8
This rule allowed the SEC to sanction any lawyer before it in an
enforcement proceeding and to set standards of professional conduct for
those who wished to continue the practice of securities law."9 Starting
in the late 1960s, the SEC attempted to use Rule 2(e) to punish attorneys
who aided or abetted securities law violations.
120
The SEC's vision of attorney obligation elicited great concern from
the corporate bar.' Most lawyers complained that the SEC's view of
attorney responsibilityviolatedthe confidential attorney-client relationship
mandated by various sections of the Model Code, the relevant source of
professional guidelines and regulations at the time.122 Others commented
"'SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1996). Section 201.102(c) was
formerly 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1986) and is generally referred to as Rule 2(e).
"'Lome & Callcott, supra note 102, at 1296. See Roberta S. Karmel, Rule 2(e) - A
Reprise, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 1993, at 3, 38 n.6 (citing comments). Karmel, a former
commissioner of the SEC, questioned the SEC's statutory authority to enforce standards of
legal responsibility under Rule 2(e).
'.Lorne & Callcott, supra note 102, at 1297.
.
2 See Junius Hoffinan, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud - The
Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1404-05 n.38 (1978) (citing scholarly response to
SEC's view); see also Lome & Calcott, supra note 102, at 1301 n.34 (same).
1
..See Kanner, supra note 57, at 260-61. The ABA issued a Statement of Policy that
took the position that the confidentiality of attorney-client consultations, which
is vital to the basic function of the lawyer as counselor, would be destroyed
or seriously impaired if it were accepted as a general principle that lawyers
must inform the SEC or others regarding confidential information received by
lawyers from their clients in circumstances where the Model Code would not
permit or require such disclosure.
Id. at 260. Lorne and Calcott similarly recognized the necessity of maintaining the attorney-
client relationship: "A client, especially one who finds itself at odds with a government agency
such as the SEC, wants and is entitled to a lawyer who will zealously represent its interests
with undivided loyalty." Lome & Calcott, supra note 102, at 1303. See also Charles Fried,
The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060, 1061 (1976) (arguing that an attorney's primary loyalty is to his client); Stephen L.
Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RFs. J. 613, 626 (suggesting that the lawyer is not responsible for the
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that the SEC lacked the statutory authority to promulgate standards of
professional responsibility for the attorneys who practiced before it."
Several years later, in In re Carter,'24 the SEC moved away from
its aggressive stance." In this case, two attorneys assisted a client, the
National Telephone Company, in obtaining financing while failing to
ensure that the client's proxy statements to shareholders adequately
disclosed the difficulties it was having in obtaining capital."2 6 Although
the attorneys advised officers of the corporation's duty to disclose the
information, they did not contact the corporation's board of directors
when the officers refused to disclose the information.1
27
The procedural history of the case suggests that the Commission
itself was unsure of how far to push the corporate attorney's duty of
disclosure under Rule 2(e).12 First, the SEC brought an injunctive action
against two attorneys under Rule 2(e), stating that their participation in
assisting a client in the preparation of proxy materials required more from
them than mere communication of the client's disclosure obligations. 9
The attorneys were found guilty of aiding and abetting their client's
disclosure violation pursuant to Rule 2(e)."' ° The SEC then reversed the
AL's finding and issued an interpretation of the ethical standards
required under Rule 2(e).
The SEC reversed for several reasons. First, according to the
Commission, the attorneys involved could not be guilty of aiding or
abetting under Rule 2(e) because they lacked the necessary scienter,
knowledge or recklessness.' Second, the SEC declined to sanction the
moral behavior of the client but is a mere representative); Tuttle, supra note 85, at 918-19
(indicating that "[t]he moral good of autonomy requires lawyers to assist individuals as they
make their way through this complex [regulatory] system").
InKarmel, supra note 119, at 3. "[T]he commission has simply arrogated this power
to itself, claiming expertise and the need for private sector assistance in policing the securities
markets. However, the licensing and discipline of attorneys and accountants is a matter
properly committed to state licensing bodies and professional associations." Congress has not
granted the SEC the authority to regulate the practice of the attorneys who come before it. d
"I41n re Carter, Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981).
"Il at 84,173. The Commission found that at the time in question, standards of
appropriate conduct under the circumstances had not been fully adopted. Id. at 84,146.
"klda t 84,152.
271a at 84,157-64.
"See generally In re Carter, Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981).
1291d at 84,152.
"OId at 84,146. An Administrative Law Judge (AL) ruled on this matter. Il
13 Id
"
"'In re Carter, Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
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attorneys for violations of standards not yet enunciated by the
Commission.' Although the SEC ultimately did not sanction the
attorneys under Rule 2(e), it nevertheless declared that their conduct
would be inadequate in the future.'34
The SEC then outlined the corporate lawyer's obligations. 3 The
SEC indicated that "[w]hen a lawyer ... becomes aware that his client
is engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy ... disclosure
requirements, his continued participation violates professional standards
unless he takes prompt steps to end the clent's [sic] non-compliance.' 36
The SEC then set forth the attorney's recommended course of action by
stating that at first."counselling accurate disclosure is sufficient."' 37 After
the corporate lawyer ascertains his client's continued unwillingness to
follow SEC disclosure regulations, the lawyer should "take further, more
affirmative steps" to end his client's violation. 3 The SEC further stated:
"A direct approach to the board of directors or one or more individual
directors or officers may be appropriate; or he may choose to try to enlist
the aid of other members of the firm's management.'"39 Resignation is
an option in the event that other options fail, although not mandatory in
all instances. 40 Above all, the lawyer is expected to demonstrate to the
SEC that he "engaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem, rather
82,847, at 84,166-69.
..Id. at 84,170.
134Id.
'"Id. at 84,172.
61n re Carter, Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,172.
"I7 d. The SEC indicated that counselling would be sufficient even if the advice was
not followed. Id.
"'Id. If the lawyer determines that his client is not in good faith seeking his advice,
the lawyer must take steps to avoid the inference that he is taking part in the "scheme of non-
disclosure." Id.
"
9Id. The essence of what is required is "prompt action." Id.
"4In re Carter, Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,172 n.77. The SEC stressed that an unsuccessful attempt to advise a client to
comply with SEC regulations does not necessarily demand an attorney's resignation. Id. The
SEC indicated that
[i]n those cases where resignation is not the only alternative, should a lawyer
choose not to resign, we do not believe the action taken must be successful to
avoid the inference that the lawyer had improperly participated in his client's
fraud. Rather, the acceptability of the action must be considered in the light
of all relevant surrounding circumstances.
[Vol. 21
THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE ATrORNEY
than having capitulated to the desires of a strong-willed but misguided
client. , 4
1
It is important to note that the SEC's opinion in In re Carter did
not impose an obligation to disclose wrongdoing to the SEC or the
investing public on corporate attorneys. 41 Unlike its complaint in
National Student Marketing,43 the SEC's pronouncement in In re Carter
of proper and ethical attorney conduct under Rule 2(e) appeared to adopt
a middle ground between whistle-blowing and silent acquiescence in
managerial misconduct.'" The attorney's professional obligation is met
insofar as he takes prompt steps to end the violations by his client.'45
Nevertheless, the SEC refused to issue a definitive statement concerning
the attorney's disclosure obligations to third parties or the public when
the client intended to commit fraud or an illegal act.'46
The ABA's Model Rule 1.13, adopted only two years after the
SEC's decision in In re Carter, was similar to the Carter standard in that
it permitted the attorney to take his concerns to the board and allowed the
attorney to resign under certain circumstances.' Nevertheless, the Rule
clearly rejected any notion of an ethical obligation to take "prompt steps"
to end a client's noncompliance with the law, and left the silent attorney
plenty of room to argue that he had taken all the steps necessary on
behalf of the corporation, given the circumstances of the time.' The
Rule thus represented an attempt to preserve the lawyer's autonomy while
placating regulators' concerns. 49 In the process, the ABA rejected the
MId at 84,172.
'
21d at 84,172-84,173.
143457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
'"See In re Carter, Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) T 82,847, at 84,172-73.
'
451d at 84,172-73.
"Id at 84,173 n.78. The Commission stated: "This case does not involve, nor do we
here deal with, the additional question of when a lawyer, aware of his client's intention to
commit fraud or an illegal act, has a professional duty to disclose that fact either publicly or
to an affected third party." Id
"See supra part HI.A. discussing the attorney's options under the Model Rules.14ld In re Carter, Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,847, at 84,168-69 (discussing the effect of an attorney's silence or inaction).
"'See Kaner, supra note 57, at 266-68 (providing a basic history of the formation of
Model Rule 1.13).
In 1978, as the Model Rules project got underway, a monitoring committee
for the ABA Business Law Section concluded that legal ethics rules were not
just grounds for discipline but had become "the basic source of law" from
which courts and administrative agencies "draw the responsibilities of
lawyers." Armed with this insight, the committee lobbied successfully for a
rule that would be demanding enough to convince the SEC not to impose
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SEC's view of the corporate attorney as a "gatekeeper,' '1' and preserved
the traditional structure of attomey-client confidentiality by prohibiting
the attorney from disclosing any confidential information to anyone
"outside the organization.' 5'
Whether Model Rule 1.13 ultimately served as a useful or proper
scheme for the prevention of securities fraud is a matter debated by
scholars and practitioners.'52 Developments in recent years suggest that
the SEC and other agencies are beginning to embrace a more aggressive
enforcement regime of attorneys wh6 advise unscrupulous clients.'53
tough new whistleblowing standards on corporate lawyers who encounter
company wrongdoing yet would be hedged enough to keep relations between
corporate lawyers and management workable.
Ted Schneyer, The ALIs Restatement and the ABA's Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?,
46 OKLA. L. REV. 25, 32 (1993) (citations onmitted).
"°A "gatekeeper" is an individual who, by virtue of his position as an indispensable
facilitator of certain action, exercises power to enforce legal rules and norms over certain
actors. Under this theory, lawyers are "gatekeepers" because they facilitate corporate
transactions. The SEC's attempts to mandate attorney disclosure therefore represented an
attempt to use third parties (lawyers) to deter corporate misconduct. Lorne & Calcott, supra
note 102, at 1297. See id. at 1297 n.10 for general commentary regarding the desirability of
treating attorneys as gatekeepers (citing articles). See also Richard W. Painter, Toward a
Marketfor Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 221 (1995) (arguing that attorney disclosure services should be regulated solely
by the market).
"'See Lorne & Calcott, supra note 102, at 1297 (explaining that the SEC brought
actions against attorneys on the ground that they were "gatekeepers" to the securities market
who facilitated their clients' crimes). In contrast, the 1981 Final Draft version stated:
When a matter has been referred to the organization's highest authority...
and that authority insists upon action, or refuses to take action, that is clearly
a violation of a legal obligation to the organization ... [a] lawyer may take
further remedial action .... Such action may include revealing information
relating to the representation of the organization ....
Kanner, supra note 57, at 267 (emphasis added).
".
2See Lorne & Calcott, supra note 102, at 1297 n.10 (setting forth a list of the various
commentary on the SEC's labelling of corporate attorneys as "gatekeepers"); see also Painter,
supra note 150, at 221-25 (setting forth the pros and cons of whistleblowing and arguing that
attorney "disclosure services" should be strictly regulated by the market).
"In re Kern, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,342, at
89,580 (Nov. 14, 1988).
In 1987, the SEC brought an enforcement proceeding under § 15(c)(4) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 against an attorney, George Kern, who assumed responsibility to carry
out his client's disclosure obligations and failed to reveal negotiations for the sale of assets of
his client, who was trying to defend itself against a hostile takeover bid. Id. at 85,590-96.
Although the Administrative Law Judge found Kern liable for causing the client to commit
disclosure violations, the SEC dismissed the proceeding, and consequently "did not reach the
issue of whether the respondent had committed any violation." Lorne & Calcott, supra note
102, at 1304.
In addition, in 1990, Congress enacted the Securities Enforcement Remedies Act,
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Setting the securities issue to one side, there is little question that Model
Rule 1.13, with its theme of "entity representation" and its concurrent
emphasis on disclosure and resignation, fails to clarify the corporate
attorney's role in the structural conflict imposed by takeovers, mergers,
and other transactions fundamentally affecting the corporation's identity.
IV. ATrORNEY OBLIGATIONS IN THE TAKEOVER CONTEXT:
POTENTIAL MISCONDUCT AND PoTmNTAL REFORM
As discussed in the preceding section of this article, Model Rule
1.13 unfortunately has several failings as applied to corporate attorneys
who advise, defend against, or negotiate takeover transactions. By
adopting the fiction that the corporation is a single entity, the Rule leaves
some constituents (officers and directors) in a better position than others
(shareholders). In addition, Rule 1.13 masks the conflict of interests
likely to arise between various constituents when takeover transactions are
imminent. As a result, the corporate attorney who perceives violations
of fiduciary duty by officers and directors must choose between the twin
evils of (1) enabling those violations or (2) breaking his own duties of
confidentiality.
This section offers two reforms to the Model Rules to better reflect
the realities of corporate representation in the takeover context. The first
reform addresses some of the concerns that arise when a target erects
takeover defenses to ward off an acquisition. Although the Delaware
courts have recognized that the directors' interests are more likely to
conflict with those of the shareholders in constructing and evaluating such
defenses,'54 the Model Rules fail to differentiate between this type of
conduct and ordinary directorial decision making. To alleviate this
which allows the SEC to issue cease and desist orders against anyone who "causes" a security
violation. Karmel, supra note 103, at 3. This portion of the Act has been criticized as "an
unfortunate return to the SEC's program of the 1970s to use Rule 2(e) as a general enforcement
tool." Ia at 35. Compare Karmel, supra note 103 (arguing against a return to such rules),
with Lome & Calcott, supra note 102, at 1307-08 (arguing that "[i]mplicitly, enactment of
these provisions must be taken to reflect a congressional view that SEC administrative
proceedings are a fair and appropriate forum in which to judge the actions not only of members
of the securities industry, but of anyone else, presumably including lawyers, whose conduct
implicates the securities laws").
See In re Fishbein, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. 89,040, at
81,256 (Mar. 1, 1992). In 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision used its administrative hearing
process to freeze the assets of Kaye, Scholer, Fieran Hays & Handler, who later agreed to pay
a sizable settlement to the agency. See Lome & Calcott, supra note 102, at 1295 n.5 (citing
both negative and positive reactions to the Fishbein case).
1"See supra text accompanying notes 41-56.
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problem, this section suggests a revised rule that allows attorneys to
request that the board obtain a second legal opinion regarding the
takeover defense and, if the board fails to do so, allows the attorneys to
withdraw his representation.
The second reform addresses some of the issues that arise in the
context of auctions. Auctions generally become necessary when directors
or officers undertake transactions which entail a sale of corporate
control.'55 To function as a source of protection for shareholders,
auctions must not be skewed by unfair practices. Consequently, this
article offers a reform whereby attorneys must notify directors when they
become aware of an officer's misconduct.
Both of the reforms suggested in this article attempt to provide
better guidance to attorneys in the takeover context, without unduly
limiting their flexibility. In addition, these rules protect corporate
constituents such as shareholders without stripping the board of the
powers with which it has been statutorily endowed. In any event, they
are intended to evoke discussion regarding the corporate attorney's proper
role within the takeover Process.
A. Takeover Defenses
Takeover defenses include any type of action undertaken by the
target to prevent takeover by another corporation or private group.
Usually, such defenses are authorized by the board of directors. 56
Among the most well-known defenses are the poison pill, 5 ' greenmail, 58
staggered boards,'59 and crown jewels. 6 According to the Unocal
standard, courts will review the propriety of the directors' adoption of
55See infra discussion at part IV.B.
6See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
"s7A poison pill is a "rights plan" whereby "shareholders receive the right to be bought
out by the corporation at a substantial premium on the occurrence of a stated triggering event."
Id. at 180.
'
58Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 n.13. Greenmail "refers to the practice of buying out a
takeover bidder's stock at a premium that is not available to other shareholders in order to
prevent the takeover." Id.
""Camden, supra note 47, at 752. Staggered boards prevent takeovers by keeping the
corporate raider from putting his own board of directors in place; thus, the raider's ability to
run the company is hindered. Id. at 752 n.99. Instead of electing every board member at once,
shareholders elect a few directors every few years. Id.
"6'When a target wishes to deter a hostile takeover, it might make a deal with a white
knight to sell its crown jewel (i.e., the most successful division of the company), and thus make
the corporation a less desirable target. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957; Camden, supra note 47,
at 751. A white knight is a "friendly third party investor." Id. at 751 n.92.
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takeover defenses with enhanced scrutiny due to the "omnipresent
specter" of officer and director self-interest. 61
The Model Rules, however, do not treat the corporation any
differently when directors adopt takeover defenses. 62 Thus, if an
attorney perceives self-interested conduct by board members in the
erection of takeover defenses that might be detrimental to shareholders in
the short or long term, he can do nothing more than counsel the board to
uphold its fiduciary duty of loyalty."
Moreover, given the attorney's own interest in retaining his
position as counsel to the corporation, it is unlikely that he would express
concern about management's self-interested conduct. This is especially
true when attorneys institute fee schedules based on results or
"performance" and not hourly billing.' Thus, it is doubtful that an
attorney would give up lucrative fees by counseling a corporation's board
to "cave in" to a hostile offer. The institution of "performance" billing,
although alarming in the takeover context, is completely sanctioned by
the Model Rules. 6"
Given the shareholder's inherent lack of protection, some
commentators have suggested that shareholders should have their own
attorney present in these situations in order to protect their interests.16s
This has been labeled the "counsel for the constituencies" argument. 167
Under this approach, the corporate attorney's role within this context
6 1 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
"I'ODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1995).
'63See MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(c) (1995). Since there is
no clear violation of law, it is highly unlikely that a corporate attorney could withdraw in this
situation. See discussion supra part 11.
"'See Daniel Hertzberg & James B. Stewart, ContingencyLegalFeefor MergerBreaks
Ground, Stirs Controversy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at 31. The IWall Street Journal
reported that Wachtell, Lipton, a prominent takeover law firm, instituted a billing system for
takeovers based on "performance." Id. These performance fees were similarly used by
Skadden Arps, who indicated that "the firm takes a 'value approach' toward its billing, which
includes consideration of the result achieved and the size of the transaction." I&
The corporate attorney's interest in getting paid undermines his independence. See
Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Layers and Their Clients, 67
S. CAL. L. Rv. 507, 545 (1994). Painter states that lawyers invest human capital in shaping
transactions, and have monetary interest in seeing that the deal is closed and therefore, "lawyer
intermediaries thus become part of the multitude of constituencies seeking to influence
corporate governance." Id
"See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a)4 (1995) (allowing the
lawyer to include "the amount involved and the results obtained" when calculating his fee).
"'Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Acquisitions, 39
HAsTINGS L.. 579, 584 (1988).
167Id
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"would be to ensure that the views of the major constituencies from both
a legal and policy perspective are brought to the board's attention."'65
Despite the presence of constituent counsel, the board would still retain
the power to make the ultimate decisions regarding the future of the
company, including reaction to potential takeovers or acquisitions.'69
It is important to note that, under this framework, the constituent
counsel provides independent oversight and voices the concerns of
shareholders; he does not have any power to make ultimate decisions
affecting the corporation. 7°
Although the "constituent" framework alleviates some of the
corporate attorney's ethical dilemma, it also creates new problems within
the takeover process. First, given the number of constituents that make
up a corporation (such as shareholders, employees, and creditors), the
provision of an attorney for each constituent could be prohibitively
expensive. Second, confidentiality issues would surface regarding how
much information the corporate attorney should reveal to the constituent
counsels. Third, conflicts might develop within the constituency itself,
thus reducing the effectiveness of the constituent counsel. 7 Finally, the
board might go through with the same action it was planning in the first
place after it hears the views of the constituent counsel. As a facilitator
of that action, the corporate attorney still is left in the ethically
uncomfortable role of watching passively as directors and officers place
their own interests above those of shareholders and the corporation.
Another suggested reform is the "consultative attorney," whereby
the board hires a second attorney, unconnected to the corporation, to offer
an opinion as to whether the board's course of action is in the best
interests of the corporation. 7 As opposed to the constituent attorney,
168ld.
'
691d. at 584. "Although management may reject the positions asserted, the presence
of separately retained independent counsel would help ensure that the various countervailing
arguments will be communicated and explained to the board." Id. To say otherwise would be
to strip the board of its powers under Delaware law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 8, § 141(a)
(1991) (indicating that the business affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors).
'
7
°Steinberg, supra note 166, at 585. Such counsel would only act as a
"communicator' of the diverse views held by the constituencies to ensure that the board is
cognizant of the various positions." Id.
'
7
'Id. at 584-85. It has been noted that "the legal and economic interests of a large,
diverse group of shareholders may be internally adversarial" and that "the legal and economic
interests of one or more groups of shareholders may conflict with the best interests of the
corporation, when that entity is looked upon as a discrete, independent entity having a perpetual
life of its own." Jonas, supra note 67, at 618.
'
72Steinberg, supra note 166, at 586. The consultative attorney would be neutral and
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"the consultative attorney represents the entity as a whole rather than the
various constituencies."'" In this sense, the consultative attorney parallels
the independent director concept. 4 The "independent attorney" is
someone who has had no direct ties to the firm, and therefore is less
likely to feel an allegiance to the board and officers at the expense of
shareholder interests. 7
The idea of the consultative attorney might have more success as
a takeover reform than the constituent counsel concept. Chancellor Allen
has endorsed the concept of the "independent attorney" in the context of
management sponsored buy-outs (MBOs). 176 The special committee of
independent directors, whose job it is to evaluate the adequacy of
management's offer, is not sufficient protection for the shareholder unless
that committee feels a special "sense of duty."'" This duty, in turn, is
assumed by the attorneys who advise it.' Allen regards the advisor's
role "in establishing the integrity of this process as absolutely crucial.
Indeed, the motives and performance of the lawyers and bankers who
specialize in the field of mergers and acquisitions is to my mind the
great, largely unexamined variable in the process [of MBO
transactions]."' 79 According to Allen, the lawyers who advise the special
committee
must be independent of management. They must accept in
their hearts that in the MBO or the auction context, their
client is the committee and not management. They must
clearly and emphatically remind their client that at this
juncture, the CEO and his associates are to be treated at
arm's-length. ... That means that from the outset, the
advisors must be prepared to forego future business. 8
would render a "second opinion." Id
"'Id Consequently, any conflict resulting from multiple representations does not
"explicitly surface." Id, at 586-87.
'See id. at 586-88.
"'Id at 586.
176See William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact
or Fantasy?, 45 Bus. LAN,. 2055, 2056-61 (1988).
'"Id at 2061.
17Sa
"Allen, supra note 176, at 2062. It must be noted that Allen's comments apply solely
to MBO situations, in which management's self-dealing is apparent and an intrinsic part of the
transaction in question.
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While takeover defenses, unlike MBOs, do not ordinarily involve
"self-dealing," they may nevertheless be the product of director or officer
self-interest at the expense of shareholder welfare. When such conflict
of interest is present, Chancellor Allen's comments regarding independent
attorneys are as applicable to takeover defenses as they are to MBOs.
In sum, the consultative or independent attorney reform offers
corporate constituencies protection without overly undermining the power
of the directors to make decisions for the corporation. It may be very
expensive, however, for a target corporation to hire a second attorney
each time it considers an offer from a potential acquiror. Thus, the
responsibility for suggesting that the directors hire independent counsel
should be placed on the corporate attorney. The following is a possible
draft of such a rule:
Model Rule 1.13(t). Takeover defenses; independent
counsel.
When the corporation is the subject of struggle for corporate
control, and the Board of Directors is considering a response
to a potential acquirer's bid, the corporate attorney shall
recommend that the Board solicit the opinion of an
independent counsel whenever it appears that the director's
or officer's interests may have the appearance of having
prejudiced its judgment in responding to a bid for corporate
control.
(i) If the Board refuses to do so, and the attorney
believes that the Board has violated its fiduciary duties to
the corporation, he may take the action defined in 1.13(c) of
these Rules.
This proposal strengthens the attorney's ability to request a second
opinion when he perceives potential violations of fiduciary duty by a
corporation's directors and officers when they promulgate takeover
defenses. The current Model Rule 1.13 permits an attorney to ask for a
second opinion only if he "knows" that an officer intends to violate a
legal obligation to the organization which will result in substantial injury
to the organization.' The proposed reform recognizes the special nature
of takeover defenses, as well as the concern that managers might employ
them for purposes of entrenchment instead of protecting shareholder
'
81MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995).
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welfare. Consequently, the proposed reform permits a corporate attorney
to take action to prevent fiduciary violations before they have occurred.
Under the above proposal, the attorney can suggest that the board retain
a separate attorney to evaluate the board's intended action so long as he
perceives the "appearance" of directorial self-interest. The invocation of
this Rule need not be taken as a suggestion of wrongdoing; rather, the
attorney can state, "I believe that you are doing this for the good of the
company, but other people might not. Therefore, you should get a
second opinion." If the board rejects the attorney's suggestion and he is
sure that the board has violated its fiduciary duties, he may resign. This
clarifies Model Rule 1.13(c) by including within its scope violations of
fiduciary duty as well as clear violations of law.
B. Auctions
According to Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,' 2 when the breakup of a company becomes inevitable, the directors'
duties change "from the preservation [of the company] as a corporate
entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
stockholders' benefit.""8 3  Although auctions technically are not
mandatory in all transfers of corporate control, managers nevertheless
find them to be the best method of maximizing the shareholders' value."
In the process of auctioning the corporation, directors have a considerable
amount of latitude in deciding which bid is the "better" offer for
shareholders."'5
When management auctions the company, lawyers often assistwith
the preparation of a process to accept and deliberate over competitive
bids. The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that the auction process
"requires the most scrupulous adherence to... fairness in the interest of
promoting the highest values reasonably attainable for the stockholders'
182506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
1'Ia at 182. The Delaware Supreme Court has expanded the application of enhanced
scrutiny to all sales of corporate control. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994).
'See Giovanelli, supra note 34, at 1552-53.
"See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). In
assessing the bid,
the board may under appropriate circumstances consider the inadequacy ofthe
bid, the nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
constituenciesother than shareholders, the risk of nonconsumnmation, and the
basic stockholder interests at stake, including the past actions of the bidder and
its affiliates in other takeover contests.
Ia at 1341-42.
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benefit."'86 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. unfortunately stands
as one of the most flagrant examples of managerial misconduct in holding
an auction."8 7
In Macmillan, the Chief Executive Officer, Edward P. Evans and
Chief Operating Officer, William F. Reilly, tainted the process by which
the company was auctioned. 8 Prior to an auction between Maxwell
International and Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts and Co. (KKR), Evans and
Reilly attempted to "restructure" the company in response to several
offers from the Bass Group.8 9 This restructuring would have left
Macmillan's officers in control of the company and its shareholders with
less payment for their shares than they would have had under the Bass
Group's offer. 9 After the Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined the
Macmillan Board from accepting management's restructuring offer, a
competition for control of the company began in earnest between KKR,
which would give Macmillan's incumbent management up to twenty
percent ownership in the newly formed company, 9' and Maxwell
Communications Corporation, which made an all-cash $80 per share
offer. 92
Macmillan did not respond to Maxwell's offer for five weeks. 93
Despite the fact that Maxwell's offer was five dollars higher than any bid
Macmillan had yet received for the sale of the company, Macmillan's
investment banker, Wasserstein, Perella, found the offer unfair and
inadequate. "
Many aspects of the ensuing auction process unfairly favored KKR
over Maxwell.'95 First, whereas "KKR was given detailed internal, non-
public, financial information, . . . culminating in a series of formal 'due
'"Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 1988). The
court further indicated that "fairness" must be considered from a general, as opposed to an
individual, standpoint. Id.
'"Id. at 1264-65.
'"Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1264-65. The court found "breaches of the duties of loyalty
and care by various corporate fiduciaries which tainted the evaluative and deliberative processes
of the Macmillan Board, thus adversely affecting general stockholder interests." Id.
"'Id. at 1265. See also Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del.
Ch. 1988).
'9°Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1265-71.
'Id. at 1273.
2 d. at 1272.
'3Id.
'
4Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1272, 1281. Wasserstein, Perella was later described as one
of Evans's hand-picked investment advisors originally retained as an advisor, not to the
company at large, but to "Macmillan's senior management." Id. at 1281. Further, Evans
persuaded Wasserstein to declare Maxwell's bid of $80 per share unfair. Id.
"'Id. at 1272-78 (recounting the problems in detail).
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diligence' presentations to KKR representatives," Maxwell "was furnished
with some, but not all, of the confidential financial information that KKR
had received.
19 6
On September 7 and 8, Macmillan representatives informed all
potential bidders that the auction process was ending and that all bids
would be due on the afternoon of September 9.1" The result was that
Robert Maxwell increased his bid to $84 all-cash per share.' Despite
this deadline, Macmillan extended it to the morning of September 10 to
allow Macmillan representatives to negotiate overnight with KKR.",
Thereafter, KKR submitted a bid to acquire ninety-four percent of the
company "through a management participation, highly leveraged, two-tier,
transaction, with a 'face value' of $85 per share."20  Although the
Macmillan Board discounted KKR's offer to $84.76 per share, they
nevertheless declared KKR the winner and announced the merger of KKR
and Macmillan on September 12, 1988.01
Three days later, Robert Maxwell announced that he would
increase his all-cash offer to $86.60 per share."' In response,
Wasserstein, Perella set in place procedures to decide on final bids and
notified the potential bidders that their offers were due by 5:30 p.m. on
September 26, 1988.03 Maxwell raised his offer to $89 per share2
KKR submitted another blended bid at $89.50 per share, payable in a
combination of cash and securities but subject to three conditions.2 "
Upon the request of Evans and Reilly, "unidentified financial
advisors" informed the Macmillan managers of the price and forms of the
two bids.2 6 Fearful that KKR would lose the auction, Evans, in the
presence of Reilly and a Pittsburgh lmiyer who had previously advised
the board, telephoned a KKR representative and tipped KKR off that
'5I d at 1272-73. "Indeed, throughout the bidding process, and despite its repeated
requests Maxwell was not given complete information [about Macmillan] until September 25
- almost two months after such data had been furnished to KKR." Id at 1273.
' Md at 1273.
'..See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1274.
"
00Id KKR's bid was payable in a "mix of cash and subordinated debt securities." Id.
"Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1274.
Id. at 1275.
...Id The conditions were: "(1) imposition of the 'no-shop' rule, (2) the grant to
KKR ofa lockup option to purchase eight Macmillan subsidiaries for S950 million, and (3) the
execution of a definitive merger agreement by 12:00 noon, the following day." Id
2"'Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1275.
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Maxwell's bid was higher.2"7 Not surprisingly, KKR came back with a
higher bid and won the auction, as Macmillan granted KKR a "lockup"
agreement which essentially ended the bidding.03 On September 27,
when Macmillan's Board deliberated, it was not informed of Evans's tip
to KKR.2"9 "Throughout the meeting Evans and Reilly remained silent,
deliberately concealing from their fellow directors their misconduct of
tipping Maxwell's bid to KKR.
210
In response to these facts, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated
Macmillan's agreement with KKR, holding that due to the taint of self-
interest, the auction would be reviewed according to the rigorous "entire
fairness" standard. 21' The Delaware Supreme Court asserted that "[w]hat
occurred here cannot survive that [entire fairness] analysis."' '
Management violated its fiduciary duties to shareholders by tainting the
auction process and favoring KKR over Maxwell despite Maxwell's
higher bid, and by concealing this information from Macmillan's board
of directors.2" 3 The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that "Evans' and
Reilly's deliberate concealment of material information from the
Macmillan Board must necessarily have been motivated by an interest
adverse to Macmillan's shareholders.
2 14
According to the court's opinion, Charles Queenan, the lawyer
present when Evans tipped KKR, was apparently an attorney advisor to
Evans and Macmillan's management, and not counsel to the
corporation.2"5 Nevertheless, questions remain: Where were Macmillan's
lawyers while the auction was taking place? Surely, they must have
known that Evans and Reilly were constructing a process tainted by self-
interest and unfair dealing?
207 d. The lawyer present at the time of Evans's phone call to KKR was Charles J.
Queenan of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart. Id. Several months earlier, Queenan had helped Evans
select Wachtell, Lipton to represent Macmillan's special committee of independent directors
to evaluate management's proposed restructuring. Id. at 1268 n.10.
'8d. at 1276-77. Moments before the deadline, KKR revised its offer and submitted
a final offer of $90 per share. Id. at 1276.
2091d. at 1277.
"VMacmillan, 559 A.2d at 1277.
2'Id. at 1279. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983), the
Delaware Supreme Court held that when self-dealing or self-interested conduct was evident,
the contested transaction was subject to an "entire fairness" test in which the Court would
examine it for both "fair price" and "fair dealing."
"Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1279.
2'13d. at 1280-83.
2'Id. at 1279.
21SId. at 1268 n.10, 1275.
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THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE ATrORNEY
Had the corporation's lawyers been present when Evans delivered
his tip to KKR, they might have been able to take action under Model
Rule 1.13(b) to notify the board of directors.1 6 Beyond this, however,
the lawyers might not have been able to withdraw under 1.13(c), as
Evans's actions may not have qualified as a "clear violation of law."21
When officers take action throughout the auction process that is likely to
taint it or undermine shareholder welfare, the corporation's lawyers
should have both the ability and responsibility to rectify this failure to
uphold fiduciary duty. Moreover, the seriousness of this violation is such
that informing the board of an officer's misconduct should be mandatory
as opposed to discretionary. Therefore, the following rule should be
promulgated in response to the conduct that took place in Macmillan:
Model Rule 1.13(g): Auctions
When the corporation's attorney is aware or is made aware of
managerial conduct that threatens the integrity of the auction
process, that attorney must:
(i) contact the Board of Directors to inform them
of this misconduct; and
(ii) if the Board of Directors fails to take any
action to rectify this matter, the attorney shall take the
action contemplated by Rule 1.13(c).
A mandatory rule such as the one suggested would force the
attorney to separate personal interests from the interests of the
corporation's officers. The rule would also strengthen the board's
oversight and monitoring function. If the board was informed of officer
conduct that threatened the integrity of the auction process, it would be
able to put an end to it before an unhappy bidder initiated expensive
litigation.
A potential drawback to this rule is that it might encourage officers
to perform their illicit activities in private, out of the earshot of lawyers.
Nevertheless, the new rule would at least preserve the integrity of the
legal profession. If officers plan to defraud board members and
shareholders, they should be forced to do so without the hand holding or
silent assent of the corporation's attorneys.
"
6
'IODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995).
2'Id Rule 1.13(c). See discussion supra part HILA.
19961
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
V. CONCLUSION
Attorneys play an important role within the takeover process. The
role was created and enlarged by the Delaware judiciary, which put a
premium on deliberative decision-making in cases such as Van Gorkom
and Unocal. These cases suggested that if lawyers participated in the
takeover process, they would assist directors in the takeover context and
protect shareholder welfare.
Unfortunately, the Delaware courts failed to consider the fact that
representing a corporate entity in times of struggle for corporate control
is not a simple task. Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
attempts to provide a flexible course of action when the lawyer becomes
aware of client misconduct, this course of action clearly is more
applicable to the securities context than it is to situations involving
takeovers, mergers, and acquisitions. When lawyers perceive
management misconduct in the takeover context, they can do little more
than inform the board of directors, and they have no leverage to compel
management to consider shareholder welfare.
With these problems in mind, two additions to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct have been suggested. These rules attempt to
provide lawyers with more guidance, and shareholders with more
protection in the takeover context. The first reform, "Rule 1.13(f)," is
discretionary, and provides the corporate attorney with the latitude to
suggest a second opinion from an independent attorney if the corporate
attorney perceives a violation of fiduciary duty in the adoption or
consideration of various takeover defenses. The second reform, "Rule
1.13(g)," is mandatory, and forces the lawyer to go the board upon the
realization of any conduct that might "threaten the integrity" of the
auctioning process. The mandatory rule enforces both the attorney's and
the board's monitoring function and simultaneously protects shareholders.
These reforms will increase the protection of shareholder welfare
in the takeover process without overly restraining the lawyer's flexibility
or violating the confidential relationship between the attorney and
corporate client. It should be noted that the SEC's extreme view that
lawyers have a whistle-blowing obligation to regulatory agencies or the
public at large in the face of management's misconduct has not been
adopted. A whistle-blowing rule undermines the takeover process
because it discourages management from seeking advice from counsel and
closes lawyers out of the process completely.
Whether these reforms are adopted or not, some change is
necessary. As takeover activity regains momentum in the 1990s, the
corporate bar should take on the responsibility of better defining the role
of the corporate attorney within the takeover process.
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